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Abstract
Background: This research was a part of a contestable rapid response initiative launched by the Health Research
Council of New Zealand and the Ministry of Health in response to the 2009 influenza A pandemic. The aim was to
provide health authorities in New Zealand with evidence-based practical information to guide the development
and delivery of effective health messages for H1N1 and other health campaigns. This study contributed to the
initiative by providing qualitative data about community responses to key health messages in the 2009 and 2010
H1N1 campaigns, the impact of messages on behavioural change and the differential impact on vulnerable groups
in New Zealand.
Methods: Qualitative data were collected on community responses to key health messages in the 2009 and 2010
Ministry of Health H1N1 campaigns, the impact of messages on behaviour and the differential impact on
vulnerable groups. Eight focus groups were held in the winter of 2010 with 80 participants from groups identified
by the Ministry of Health as vulnerable to the H1N1 virus, such as people with chronic health conditions, pregnant
women, children, Pacific Peoples and Māori. Because this study was part of a rapid response initiative, focus groups
were selected as the most efficient means of data collection in the time available. For Māori, focus group
discussion (hui) is a culturally appropriate methodology.
Results: Thematic analysis of data identified four major themes: personal and community risk, building community
strategies, responsibility and information sources. People wanted messages about specific actions that they could
take to protect themselves and their families and to mitigate any consequences. They wanted transparent and
factual communication where both good and bad news is conveyed by people who they could trust.
Conclusions: The responses from all groups endorsed the need for community based risk management including
information dissemination. Engaging with communities will be essential to facilitate preparedness and build
community resilience to future pandemic events. This research provides an illustration of the complexities of how
people understand and respond to health messages related to the H1N1 pandemic. The importance of the
differences identified in the analysis is not the differences per se but highlight problems with a “one size fits all”
pandemic warning strategy.
Background
During an influenza pandemic the lack of experience of
dealing with such hazards increases public reliance on
information from government, public health agencies,
employers, the community and the media. A challenge
for government and health agencies is sustaining public
awareness and alertness over a protracted period [1,2].
Responding to the challenges posed by managing the
risk from relatively unknown health hazards requires
recognition of the fact that promoting sustained action
involves not only getting the information right but also
ensuring that it is communicated in ways that accom-
modate diversity in community characteristics, needs
and expectations. The lack of experience also calls for
research to provide the evidence base health authorities
need to respond effectively in circumstances (e.g. rapid
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situ.
T h e r ei se v i d e n c et h a tg r e a t e rl e v e l so fp e r c e i v e ds u s -
ceptibility to and perceived severity of the disease and
greater belief in the effectiveness of recommended pre-
ventative and avoidant measures are important predic-
tors of behavior [3-5]. It is important to accommodate
the fact that disbelief in the effectiveness of measures
can result in people failing to act and developing dis-
trust of sources of information [6]. Previous New Zeal-
and research identified a general belief that local
agencies will manage a pandemic well and that New
Zealand is a relatively safe place to be in the event of a
pandemic. However, there was also a lack of trust in
information providers as well doubt that the health sys-
tem would cope [4]. Trust is a crucial component of
effective risk communication when people face uncer-
tainty and levels of trust are correlated with people’s
perceptions of the integrity of information. Lack of trust
can be exacerbated by scepticism about the veracity of
health risk warnings and the view that media are sensa-
tionalist and untrustworthy [7,8]. Being uncertain about
an outbreak, and thinking it, and its consequences had
been exaggerated have been associated with a lower like-
lihood of behavioural change [5]. Increasing trust is a
function of the degree to which agencies engage with
and empower communities [6].
Lack of trust in authorities may also affect how people
process and interpret health messages and advice,
increase concerns and interfere with the way that the
risk messages are interpreted and acted on [9]. Trans-
parency and honest communication where both good
and bad news is conveyed can empower the public to
make their own decisions [1]. The public are more likely
to take appropriate action and accept the recommenda-
tions if they have been involved in the decision-making
process, and the quality of the relationship between
authorities and the community has a direct effect on the
uptake of risk messages, and trust in the message provi-
ders [2].
The primary objective of this study was to provide
health authorities with evidence-based practical informa-
tion to guide the development and delivery of key health
messages for H1N1 and other health campaigns. The
study focused on community responses to key health
messages in the 2009 and 2010 H1N1 campaigns.
Methods
The study was part of a rapid response initiative; there-
fore focus groups were selected as the most efficient
means of data collection in the time available. Eight
semi-structured focus groups were recruited between
May and July 2010 (the New Zealand winter season)
comprising 7 to 13 participants each and lasting
approximately 1 hour. Separate focus groups were con-
ducted for each of the target groups with a total of 80
participants representative of five target populations
groups identified in consultation with Ministry of Health
staff: Māori, Pacific Peoples, children (or parents of chil-
dren), general population, a n dv u l n e r a b l ep e o p l ew i t h
chronic conditions (defined as those who are eligible for
subsidised vaccinations, such as pregnant women, those
with diabetes, using asthma inhalers, with heart disease
or kidney problems. Participant characteristics are sum-
marised in Table 1.
Purposive sampling methods were used to ensure the
sample met the criteria specified by the Ministry of
Health.
Table 1 Participant characteristics
N (%)
Gender
Male 15(19)
Female 65(81)
Ethnicity
NZ European 16(20)
Māori 28(35)
Pacific 22(28)
Other 7(9)
Not stated 7(9)
Age
18-24 5(6)
25-34 14(18)
35-44 11(14)
45-54 21(26)
55-64 14(18)
65+ 14(18)
Ns 1(1)
In paid employment
No 22(28)
Yes 33(41)
Not stated 25(31)
Health conditions
Yes 36(45)
No 31(39)
Not Stated 13(16)
Focus Group Category
General Population: with children G1
General Population: chronic conditions G2
General Population: mixed G3
Pacific Peoples: chronic conditions and pregnant/very
young children
P1
Pacific Peoples: non-chronic. P2
Pacific Peoples: chronic conditions P3
Māori: Kaumātua M1
Māori: Tamariki Ora Mothers (young Māori mothers) M2
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with the period in which people are most aware of flu
and the need for preventive and protective actions. Par-
ticipants were recruited using posters in a community
library and through contacts within key agencies (e.g.
university research centres, Pacific health services, dis-
trict health boards, and the Ministry of the Social Devel-
opment). Staff of the Research Centre for Māori Health
and Development,
Massey University were responsible for the Māori
components of the research to ensure a culturally
appropriate methodology given the time restraints of the
study. In contrast to New Zealanders of European des-
cent, Māori possess different cultural characteristics. For
example, based on cultural dimensions [10] Māori score
higher on dimensions such as individualism-collectivism,
power distance and uncertainty avoidance compared
with their counterparts. Because these differences have
significant implications for social influences on beha-
viour and for the nature of the relationships that exist
between community members and health authorities, it
was essential to ensure that data were collected in cultu-
rally sensitive and competent ways. Hence Māori were
treated differently from the perspective of the data col-
lection approach adopted. This is consistent with effec-
tive cross cultural research methods [11].
All focus group sessions (except Māori groups) were
recorded and independently, professionally transcribed.
Transcriptions were mainly verbatim, with verbal pad-
ding and hesitations omitted. Apart from the facilitators,
specific individuals were not identified in the transcripts
or any subsequent reports. The extracts used to illus-
trate the content of each theme are identified by codes
which correspond to the focus group transcripts from
which they were taken (Table 1).
The analysis of the focus group data (excluding Māori
groups) was undertaken by a single researcher who was
neither present at the focus groups nor had read any
preliminary findings. This work was verified by the
focus group facilitators to ensure that any “contextual
richness” had not been missed in the data. Thematic
analysis was used to identify themes and concepts across
the entire data set (6 transcripts) to “identify repeated
patterns of meaning” [12]. The process involved working
through the six phases of thematic analyses as identified
by Braun and Clarke [12].
This study was approved by the Massey University
Human Ethics Committee: Southern A (ref 10/32, 21
May 2010). Written informed consent was obtained
from all participants.
Results and discussion
The final coding scheme consisted of 17 themes which
were grouped into four main categories: risk, building
community understanding, responsiveness and informa-
tion preferences. Transcript extracts were selected on
the basis of their relevance to the theme under discus-
sion and all identifying information has been removed.
National preparedness and risk
People’s perception of risk is a product of the perceived
likelihood of a pandemic and its perceived conse-
quences. The analysis identified that people made judge-
ments about both likelihood and consequences.
Understanding these inputs helps tailor risk communi-
cation strategies. Previous research identified a general
belief that New Zealand, as a result of factors such as
geographic isolation, reduce the likelihood of a pan-
demic and thus increase a belief that New Zealand is a
relatively safe place to be in the event of a pandemic [4].
Perceived risk was also attenuated by a belief that bor-
der control agencies will prevent pandemic flu entering
New Zealand, with this possibly resulting in people
transferring responsibility for preparing from themselves
to border control agencies [6].
“It’s pretty much a one-border control place. That’s
why that’s better. We’re lucky, because we’ve got
only that one contact point coming in.” (G3)
Other participants were aware that our perceived geo-
graphical isolation does not in fact translate to a
decrease in risk. In fact H1N1 arrived in New Zealand
early in the global pandemic of 2009 with students
returning from a school trip to Mexico and the USA.
“Well we think that we’re different because we’re far
away. But actually, if you think of how people tra-
velled here, it’s the biggest factor for it always,
because everyone who comes here comes in an aero-
plane, pretty much. And they come from every-
where.” (G3)
Concern and risk acceptance
Discussion reflected variable levels of awareness of and
reaction to pandemics. Many regarded the 2009 H1N1
pandemic as an overreaction that was not taken very
s e r i o u s l yb ym a n yp e o p l e .T h ef o l l o w i n ge x t r a c ti l l u s -
trates the concept of “normalisation bias” in which peo-
ple extrapolate from the current experiences (H1N1) to
d e f i n ew h a taf u t u r ep a n d e m i cw o u l dl o o kl i k ea n d
therefore underestimate their future risk which makes
them less respective to current health risk messages [6].
“I thought it was scaremongering, personally. I
thought the way it was handled was quite interest-
ing, and I think it also made a lot of people very
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need to be paranoid about.” (G3)
For some participants it was the use of term “pan-
demic” that gave rise to the sense of overreaction by
suggesting something more serious than what actually
occurred.
“It became reasonably clear reasonably quickly last
time that hundreds and thousands and millions wer-
en’td y i n g .E v e nw h e nt h e yk e p to ns o r to fs a y i n g
things were happening, and then you saw the num-
bers, it just didn’t add up.” (G1)
There is evidence that higher levels of general anxiety
and perceptions of high risk severity are related to a
greater likelihood of carrying out preventive and avoi-
dant protective behaviours [3,5]. However, it is impor-
tant to note that this relationship is only present when
people with high risk perceptions also know what to do
to manage their risk. If people do not know what to do,
or question the veracity of the advice offered, they are
more likely to respond by denying the risk or transfer-
ring it to others [13]. Whilst most of the participants in
the general population groups regarded swine flu as “bit
of a joke, really” others reported feelings of anxiety, fear
or panic. In particular, reports of flu-related deaths gave
rise to more serious concern.
For those who felt that geographical remoteness pro-
vided some form of protection, it was not until cases
were reported within New Zealand that the threat
became more real. This shift in thinking is important as
the perceived relevancy and immediacy of risk affects
the decision to act or not to act on information [4,8].
“Because you kind of go, well, we’re just little old
New Zealand, where nothing happens. You know,
we’ll be right. And it wasn’t until you actually heard
that people in New Zealand had brought it back
from overseas. And that’s when you really does go
“Ooh! Alright.” (G3)
Concern about news reports from overseas also
related to the reliability of the information in terms of
both its trustworthiness and relevance to “us”.
’The other thing, people are a bit cynical about the
whole thing. Because there are these people dying in
Mexico, you think, well, there are people sick in hos-
pital. You know, I’ve got no idea what the health
system’s like there.” (G2)
Such comments reflect a belief “it won’t happen to me
because - it happens to others”. Through the process of
“othering”, individuals focus on differences in others,
effectively creating a separation between “us” and
“them” [14]. By projecting the risk of infection and
death onto “them” the sense of powerlessness and vul-
nerability is reduced for “us” [15].
Cynicism about the veracity of media reports was not
limited to news from overseas. Indeed there was a
strong feeling that the New Zealand media had a central
role in the “overhyping” of the 2009 and 2010 pandemic
risk. Media are credited with amplifying the risk percep-
tions in such a way that risk communicated may not be
an accurate reflection of the true risk [7].
“I think the news media have a lot to blame, because
they want to make news. They sensationalise stuff.
That’s not helpful.” (G2)
Public distrust in journalists and the sensationalising
of health related stories can also be a hindrance to tak-
ing the risk seriously and of undertaking precautionary
measures [5]. A belief that risk has been exaggerated is
associated with an increased sense of helplessness and
frustration and a reduction in the likelihood that people
will prepare in the short-term [5,7,16].
Contextualisation and saliency
In an attempt to understand potential risks people situ-
ate risk-knowledge in historical and local contexts [17].
T h i sc a nb es e e ni nt h ef o c u sg r o u pd i s c u s s i o n si n
which participants were more concerned about other
risks, including illnesses such as heart disease, cancer,
meningitis, and respiratory disease.
Much of the discussion in the general population
groups focused on their reassuring themselves that the
pandemic was indeed an overreaction and a “media
beat-up” as they believe that this had happened before
with other events. In this condition, people preferentially
seek information that reinforces this belief and this may
reduce the likelihood of their attending to public infor-
mation. Maintaining a sceptical and cynical perspective
is a means of “distancing” themselves from the threat.
“Like the bird flu that was... that, I think, killed
some... a few people in Canada. And people said it
was going to be the next big flu, and it wasn’t.” (G2)
Risk perception
There is evidence that individual perceptions of risk are
important determinants in undertaking preventive, and/
or protective behaviours fore v e n t ss u c ha sp a n d e m i c s
as long as people know how to manage their risk
[3,5,12,21]. Some participants appeared to have a sense
of “personal invulnerability” based on their history of
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were also indicative of the phenomenon of unrealistic
optimism. This means that while people accept the exis-
tence of a risk to the community in general, they see
themselves as less vulnerable or more capable than
others. This bias results in their transferring risk from
themselves to others and seeing risk communications as
applying to others rather than to themselves [6]. This
bias represents a significant constraint on the effective-
ness of risk communication. However, encouraging
active discussion of pandemic issues in community
groups can reduce its influence.
“I’ve been fortunate enough to... I don’tk n o wt h a t
I’ve even actually ever had the flu, even ordinary flu,
in my life... So I seem to have a bit of a natural
immunity to it, luckily enough, so... yeah.” (G2)
In contrast there were others who expressed a heigh-
tened sense of risk due to their personal circumstances
and health history. Assessing their personal risk in this
way supports the view that people’su n d e r s t a n d i n go f
risk is developed not only through cultural and sub-cul-
tural membership, but also through personal experience
[17]. This highlights the importance of risk communica-
tion encouraging people to personalize information.
“I’ve always had a problem too, because my partner’s
a primary school teacher by trade. She’db r i n gt h e
things home. ...There was this flu going round, and
I’d be getting it”. (G2)
While all groups were aware of the concept of “high
risk” groups the relationship between knowledge of
“high risk factors” and individual perceptions of risk was
less clear. Although some participants identified them-
selves as “high risk” they appeared to be uncertain about
what this meant for them. Others used “othering” to
minimise their own perception of risk by differentiating
themselves from those who they identified as “high
risk”. This social construction of boundaries of “self”
and “other” and their relationship to boundaries of
“safety” and “danger” are particularly relevant to under-
standing notions of health and disease [18].
However, the self/other divide can be used to facilitate
preparing [13]. By considering whether something can
be done to assist those more vulnerable, people are
more likely to also consider what they can do for
themselves.
Key health messages
Recall of key health messages was varied, however most
participants were aware of hygiene self-efficacy measures
such as hand washing, sanitiser use, covering of coughs
and sneezes, and staying at home. This was particularly
strong in one of the Pacific Peoples groups and for
many appeared to be translated into action.
“Mainly they tell you to wash your hands....Cover
your mouth when you cough.......And don’ts h a r e
hankies, they say, yeah.” (P2)
There was some recall of the 2009 posters and the
messages which they contained. Although some who
recalled the posters expressed concern that they were
inaccurate and overused. There was generally less recall
of the 2009 television advertisements, and even less
recall of the messages they were conveying. Overall, par-
ticipants did not feel that they were better prepared or
had changed their behaviour as a result of the informa-
tion which they recalled from 2009. Where lessons had
been learnt from the previous year, these were mostly
related to improved personal hygiene measures.
Awareness of the 2010 campaign was scant and what
was recalled tended to be from commercial advertising,
for example, from private commercial companies pro-
moting flu vaccinations and household hygiene
products.
Information sources
Participants reported receiving pandemic information
from a variety of media sources including newspapers,
TV, radio and the internet. However the primary source
of information for participants was their workplace and/
or community. This differs from previous research in
which Google was listed as a primary source of informa-
tion [8] and television was the preferred means of
receiving information during a pandemic [19].
The general population groups tended to report work-
p l a c ea sak e ys o u r c eo fi n f o r m a t i o n ,i n c l u d i n gw o r k -
place intranets. In contrast there was general agreement
in the Pacific Peoples groups that their primary sources
of information were the community. This included
social networks and family, regular forums and meet-
ings, church groups and health centres. This supports
the view that when faced with uncertainty, people turn
to others to reduce their uncertainty and guide their
preparation; often these are family and friends, but also
health agencies with whom they have a direct relation-
ship [2]. This highlights the importance of both recog-
nising the existence of diverse communities that
facilitate developing understanding and engaging with
these communities to ensure that information can be
tailored to meet the needs, goals and expectations of
each group.
“And even in the church. Because one thing in the
church is, our people fear God, and they always go
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key people that talks into the community.” (P2)
The 2010 campaign had largely gone unnoticed by
Māori tribal elders (kaumātua). They did not believe
that information was readily accessible, no one had seen
articles in the local press regarding H1N1 and pamph-
lets and posters “were not freely available”.T h i sv i e w
was mirrored in the young Māori mothers (Tamariki
Ora) focus group.
The kaumātua group felt that information is best dis-
seminated to places of work, school and family and to
Māori health providers to ensure coverage of the Māori
population. It appeared that the messages in the media
did not make an impact with Tamariki Ora mothers.
Community strategies
Previous research has shown that community participation
and trust in emergency management agencies played sig-
nificant roles in increasing community preparedness, will-
ingness to take responsibility for own safety, risk
acceptance and satisfaction with communication [2]. Pub-
lic are more likely to take appropriate action and accept
the recommended actions if they have been engaged in all
aspects of the risk management and decision-making pro-
cesses through mechanisms such as focus groups or for-
ums in ways that empower people to take action [6,20].
Kaumātua were of the view that the 2007/08 campaign
had been successful because the District Health Board
had come out into the community and involved them in
planning or providing information, but “it had not been
effectively followed up on”. A number of other com-
ments also highlighted the importance of engaging with
communities and disseminating information through
community mechanisms.
“Civil Defence needs to be proactive, and actually
make sure that they’ve got the right community peo-
ple, and the right community organisations on the
board.” (G3)
With respect to workplace pandemic or disaster
response plans, most participants had little or no knowl-
edge of these. Some were aware of general plans or the
existence of emergency supplies at work. There was a
general belief in one group that emergency preparedness
was seen as an “individual responsibility” by their
employers. The apparent lack of clearly-articulated
workplace response strategies is consistent with previous
research [20].
Preparedness
As with previous research [2,20,21] few participants had
stocked up on emergency supplies or prepared for the
pandemic any other way. Some individuals had stocked
up on food and essential supplies and/or had a family
disaster plan.
“I’ve certainly thought about how would we get food,
or how much food did we have in the house, if we
were to get quarantined.” (G1)
W h i l es o m ep a r t i c i p a n t sr e p o r t e dt h a tt h e yh a d
already prepared emergency boxes, others were yet to
act on their intentions to do so; it was on the list of
things to do. Participants were aware of advice to stock-
up on pharmaceutical products but a number found the
array of over the counter products available very
confusing.
Perceived or actual economic impact influences psy-
chological and behavioural responses [22]. Many partici-
pants expressed concern that the cost of emergency kits
could be a barrier for low income families and that
some sort of financial assistance should be available,
particularly as they may believe that the costs of acting
will only incur a benefit in the event of a pandemic and
this may not occur until some future date.
“And the thing is that it would affect... I mean, ima-
gine someone on a really base-level income... isn’t
going to have a preparedness kit. So they’re the ones
that are going to suffer, through in some ways, no
fault of their own.” (G2)
Vaccinations
Attitudes towards having the flu vaccination varied
greatly as did uptake. Discussion concerned H1N1,
H5N1, pandemic flu and seasonal influenza. There were
those who routinely have them and those who “don’td o
flu shots”. Uptake rates ranged from none in the Tamar-
iki Ora mothers group to over 90% of those present in
the kaumātua group.
For some participants the decision whether or not to
have the vaccination was related to their perception of
risk.
“Yes. I normally do have it. But I insisted on having
it early, even though the GP was only giving it to
p e o p l ew h ow e r ei nv u l n e r a b l eg r o u p s ,b e c a u s eo f
the fact that I was travelling ...” (G1)
There were others who, having identified themselves
as being in an “at risk” group, still chose not to be vacci-
nated. For these and others it appeared to be a balan-
cing act between their perceived risk of influenza
against the perceived risks associated with the vaccine
itself. The “costs”, psychological and health “benefits”,
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influence people when making a decision about whether
to act on advice about a pandemic [2].
“I’m kind of stuck on that one. I’ve certainly thought
more about it this year, as to whether I should just
take the risk; but I’mn o tg o i n gt o .I ’m still not hav-
ing one.” (G1)
Several of the Tamariki Ora mothers were apprehen-
sive and confused about the flu injection and wanted
more information about “immunisation for their chil-
dren”.
“Will the current flu injection help us to stay
immune for several years?” (M2)
Whilst some participants elected not to have the vac-
cination even if it was free, for others cost was a signifi-
cant issue. There was also a degree of cynicism about
the vaccination and flu treatment amongst those that
reported not having had one. In particular cynicism was
expressed with respect to Tamiflu
®.
“The whole Tamiflu... again, it makes me cynical,
you know. Somebody was making a heck of a lot of
money out of that, you know?” (G2)
The reluctance to be vaccinated and the cynicism illu-
strated by these extracts is consistent with research
showing that decisions to engage in preventive and avoi-
dant behaviours is influenced by attitudes towards pub-
lic health interventions [9] including having confidence
in the efficacy of the behaviour [3]. It is worth noting
that the latter beliefs influence the level of trust in
health agencies and that specifically advising people
(about all preparedness measures and not just antivirals)
about why specific preparations are required increases
the likelihood of adoption and helps maintain trust in
health agency sources of information [12].
Staying home and social distancing
Participants had heard the social isolation/distancing
message.
“If you’re sick, go home. And if you’re sick and
you’re at home, stay there....That’sr i g h t .I ’mq u i t e
vocal about that anyway. I hate seeing people sick
around me.” (G1 with agreement from several other
participants)
Although participants recognised that isolation is an
important response strategy, the economic pressures to
go to work instead of staying at home was a major
concern.
“That’s a big push, yeah, that’s a big reason why peo-
ple still go out, even though they know they have a
cough. ...Yeah, that pushes me (into employment).
......You send your kids to school sick. .........Yeah,
because you haven’t the time, yeah.” (P2)
This is consistent with previous research showing that
perceived or actual economic impact is a major factor in
decisions around avoiding the flu [9,19,21,22]. These
issues can be compounded by not preparing, being una-
ware of workplace policies and plans (e.g., policies about
wage payments if people are advised to stay home).
Kaumātua believed should a person develop flu-like
symptoms they should isolate themselves from other
members of the community, however they were con-
cerned that when individuals are isolated they may not
be contacted by members of the community or whānau.
Concerns were also expressed by this group about
observing specific cultural practices and greeting proto-
cols, reflecting the role that cultural and sub-cultural
membership has in people’s understanding of risk [17].
Participants wanted guidelines about who should stay
h o m ea n dw h e n ,a n dt h e yw a n t e db a c k i n gf r o mt h e i r
employers with respect to this issue. Participants felt
that they had been given contradictory information
about when to stay home and when to go to work or
s c h o o lw h i c hl e f tt h e mf e e l i n gu n c e r t a i na b o u tw h a tt o
do. Consistency of advice is a significant important fac-
tor in communications from key agencies [3].
Information preferences
“Knowing the difference” between swine flu and other
flu emerged as a significant issue. This reflects previous
reports of a strong desire from the public for symptom
details about influenza [19] and the finding that public
information about signs and symptoms are beneficial to
public understanding of a pandemic [8]. Participants
across all groups wanted to know about the specific
swine flu symptoms which they could use to identify it
and protect themselves from possible infection.
“I mean, the big thing is what are the symptoms,
particularly what are the unique symptoms to what-
ever the pandemic is, that differentiates it from regu-
l a rf l u ,o rac o l d ?A n dh o wi n f e c t i o u si si t ,a n d
what’s the mechanism of infection” (G1)
There is a view that surveillance combined with good
scientific information and operational research is crucial
in limiting the spread of H1N1 [23]. A number of parti-
cipants were concerned about testing and monitoring.
They felt that the Ministry should not have “cut off
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the H1N1 after health services became inundated with
patients undermined the advice that the Ministry of
Health was giving.
Facts
In addition to the desire for symptom details many par-
ticipants wanted concrete facts, such as how many peo-
p l ew e r ed i a g n o s e dw i t ho rd y i n gf r o ms w i n ef l u .S o m e
participants wanted to know percentages; others pre-
ferred the information to be given as numbers because
they found percentages confusing. For many participants
it was not necessarily numbers they wanted but infor-
mation that helped them judge the “seriousness” of the
pandemic and their level of personal risk.
There was general agreement in a Pacific Peoples
group that simplicity in the framing of messages was
important. This aligns with the contention people can
absorb only a small amount of information at a time
and have difficulty understanding some kinds of infor-
mation. Risk communication should take this into
account and identify the most critical facts [24].
Trust and honesty
It is apparent from previous research that trust in
authorities and satisfaction with communications
received are associated with compliance of preventive,
avoidant, and management behaviours [2,3,22]. People
want the truth, even if it is worrisome, so honesty is
crucial [24] even if that meant being told “we don’t
know, at this stage”.
“Give it to us the way it is. Because I’ms u r ea d u l t s
are capable of dealing with that information, and
then, you know, making their own choices later of
how they deal with the information, but to actually
be given that information, without any drama, and
yet not being, you know, pushed under the rug
somewhere.” (P3)
W h i l es o m ep a r t i c i p a n t se x p r e s s e dc o n f i d e n c ei nt h e
organisations providing information, others felt that they
were not being given all the facts and that this affected
their ability to make informed decisions. Trust in the
information given is important because it affects the
perceived credibility of risk assessments from authorities
which in turn can influence response behaviours [3]. It
is important to note that trust can be easily lost if peo-
ple believe that agencies are not acting in their interests
or do not provide information that meets their needs
and once lost, trust is difficult to regain [6].
“Well, I’m always dubious about the... particularly
the death rates that... that was not real... from what I
u n d e r s t a n d ,al o to fp e o p l et h a td i e dh a dp r e - e x i s t -
ing conditions.” (G2)
Transparency and honest communication where both
good and bad news is conveyed empowers the public to
make their own decision [1] and that openness of gov-
ernment communication and acknowledging uncertainty
is important for fostering trust [3].
Consistency of advice also appears to be an important
factor in communications from key agencies [3]. Partici-
pants provided a number of examples where conflicting
information or advice led to a feeling of confusion and
frustration and loss of trust in key sources.
“...at the beginning of the swine flu, the communica-
tion breakdown between the hospital and the local
GP services. Because people were coming to the
GPs, and they were referring them to the hospital,
and then they were... (saying “No, we only take
emergencies”), there’s a lot of confusion.” (P1)
Dissatisfaction with health providers was not limited
to poor inter-agency communication. Just getting an
appointment with a GP was difficult for some and
others had concerns about how they were treated and
the advice which they were given. The issue of financial
impact is also relevant to seeking medical assistance
with a number of participants reporting that the high
cost of a doctor’s appointment was definitely a deterrent
to seeking treatment. The issue of trust is illustrated by
this extract from a woman who believes she was mis-
diagnosed in the emergency department putting vulner-
able family members at risk.
“Id o n ’t think she knew what I had. I just think she
wanted to go tick, “Goodbye, here’s the antibiotic.”
... and I believed her. And that’sh o wn a i v eIw a s .I
should have gone again, but I thought, “Oh no, she’s
got the ticket. She’s got the certificate that says ‘doc-
tor’.” I trusted her. ... when I came here further, I
had the swine flu, I just wanted to get out and go
back up there and find that little lady, and taking
her and her certificate, and bang her up the side of
the head and say, “You could have taken out my
granddaughter, my daughter, and my father, because
you were in too much of a hurry to go tick, tick,
tick.” (P2)
Practical information
Focus group participants expressed a desire for practical
information to guide their responses to the influenza
threat. Such views are consistent with previous reports
of research participants preferring risk messages that
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reduce risk and/or mitigate consequences [4,5,12]. Peo-
ple want to know how to protect themselves and their
families during an influenza pandemic and the ability to
act provides a sense of relief that “they could do some-
thing” [8]. It has been reported that participants who
received little or no information about protective actions
they could take, expressed helplessness and frustration
[8],
Targeted messages
Language preference has been shown to be an important
factor in satisfaction with risk communications [4]. Par-
ticipants in the Pacific Peoples groups stated strongly
that messages should be communicated in an appropri-
ate language.
“Sometimes our older folk, they don’tu n d e r s t a n d
English. They have to be in original languages. The
diversity of the Pacific - I mean, for some of our
older people, because it’s their cultural background,
and it’s so hard for them to understand.” (P2)
The acceptance of public health messages can be
affected by factors such as socio-cultural behaviours,
gender roles, generational differences, religious beliefs
and language preferences [9]. The following extract also
supports the argument that emotions can also cloud
people’s decision making, so communicators must treat
audiences respectfully [24]. In order to accommodate
these cultural and demographic factors it is important
to work through communities.
“Sometimes I don’t think it’s just not only their lan-
guage....it’s the way you use your language. You
speak too fast, your English words are beyond me.
And they’re not dumb, the people. .... Sometimes it’s
just the way you... your tone. If you talk to them like
they’re dumb, well they’ll just...They’ll shut up.” (P2)
The following comment from a kaumātua also sup-
ports the argument that key health information and
advice must take into account factors such as socio-cul-
tural behaviours, spiritual beliefs and language prefer-
ences. In the event of an outbreak or pandemic, it
would be difficult for kaumātua not to observe the pro-
tocols that are very much part of their traditional prac-
tices.
If there was a outbreak we would have been ok, we
were concerned at the lack of knowledge of tikanga
Māori and it is not usual to have to stay away from
m a r a eo rt os t a ya th o m e ,t h et h o u g h to fm a s sb u r -
ials in a pandemic was culturally irresponsible.” (M1)
Timing and frequency of messages
Discussions around preferences for the timing and fre-
quency of key health messages were contradictory. On
one hand participants, especially those in one Pacific
Peoples group expressed a desire to be given early infor-
mation through frequent messages. Other participants
however, felt that they were being “bombarded” with
too much information too soon.
Participants wanted to be warned about potential risk
well in advance to allow time for them to prepare. This
supports the view that occasional media reports are
insufficient to adequately inform individuals about pan-
demic preparedness, and interventions are needed
before a pandemic occurs to improve public awareness,
promote effective coping responses and help in the suc-
cessful implementation of plans [25].
In contrast others thought it would be better if infor-
mation was given much closer to the actual event. This
is consistent with previous research that found partici-
pants preferred “just in time” delivery of information to
avoid having to think about pandemic influenza unless
they had to or unless a pandemic was imminent [8].
“Just-in-time” messaging that included technical terms,
risks, health benefits and protective actions has been
shown to help align public perception with realistic
assessments of pandemic threat [24]. Both of these per-
spectives reflect problems with people’s risk beliefs.
Those who desire advance warnings may be unaware
that a pandemic could be in New Zealand very quickly
and possibly before its existen c ei sf o r m a l l yi d e n t i f i e d .
They may not have the time they expect to prepare.
Those who adopt a “just in time” approach may overes-
timate their capacity to prepare in a short time frame (e.
g., food supplies in supermarkets being rapidly depleted
and not restocked).
“Id o n ’t know we should say anything unless there’s
a clear danger, because otherwise you just get used
to it. I mean you ignore it.” (G1)
The extract above illustrates the serious problem that
arises from warning fatigue. Too many early warnings
can result in cynicism, disengagement and a decline in
trust [26]. Warning fatigue is more likely to result from
potential threats with a ‘long-lead-time’- like pandemics,
w h e r et h e r ea r em a n yw a r n i n g si nt h ea b s e n c eo ft h e
actual threat. People “get sick of hearing it” and are
likely to “switch off” and ignore future warnings.
Gray et al. BMC Public Health 2012, 12:205
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/12/205
Page 9 of 12“B u tIt h i n kp a r to fi ti s ,t h a tw e ’ve had so many
health scares in the past decade. Like SARS, and dif-
ferent types of flu, and it’s all this big media hype
thing....and then it just kind of disappears.” (G3)
Effective communications
Focus group discussion about other information cam-
paigns highlighted differences between what participants
considered to be effective communications and from
who they wanted to hear important messages. Some
advertisements were seen as very effective because they
were “straight-up, to the point” and included people to
whom the participants could relate.
“Because they’re using the Pacific People, and the
different languages. Like after the Cook Island one,
they have a Cook Island lady saying, ("Don’th a v e
hesitation”).” (P2)
The perceived success of other campaigns was asso-
ciated with the person fronting that campaign as much
as the quality of the presentation.
“Going back to those first John Kirwan (sporting
celebrity) ads, they were just really nicely shot, with
someone that... most New Zealand men would
respect John Kirwan. He was the ideal person.” (G1)
Such comments confirm previous research that shows
that people are more likely to act when information
comes from within their own community; community
leaders are highly credible sources of information and
people would prefer them to be trained in issues of pan-
demic risk management [27].
The front person was an important factor in present-
ing important messages. There was some interesting
debate about who could “be trusted” and who was
“believable”. Some participants felt that important mes-
sages should come from medical professionals or official
agencies such as the Ministry of Health, District Health
Board or WHO. This view highlights the importance of
credibility which is regarded in the literature as a critical
element in effective risk management and communica-
tion [28,29]. Communicators who are also scientists and
perceived as being impartial and knowledgeable are
more likely to be regarded as credible [28].
“Well, the Ministry of Health, ideally, should front it,
because you know, they’re the national organisation.”
(G3)
Others argued that the front person should be a role
model, or someone recognisable to the public at large.
“...I think it might stick in your mind a lot more if
you’d got someone that looks familiar to you telling
you the information. And I think that we do actually
trust someone that maybe is a household name,
more than someone that they have no idea who they
are”. (P1)
As some participants pointed out, it may be that a
variety of communicators may be best. Indeed there is
support in the literature for employing a multidisciplin-
ary approach to risk communication with input from a
range of experts [1,24].
Limitations of this study
Any conclusions drawn from this study should be con-
sidered tentative as the findings cannot be generalised
to the population at large. It is not known whether the
individuals who chose to participate differed from those
who were eligible but chose not to participate. Whilst
this study intentionally involved participants with
diverse cultural and ethnic backgrounds, and included
individuals from vulnerable groups, the sample does not
permit conclusions regarding the effect of socio-demo-
graphic factors such as age or gender. Further research
is needed to explore the complexities involved in the
way in which the framing of risk messages impacts on
people’s perception of risk and subsequent preparedness
and response behaviours.
Conclusions
The results of this study highlight the problem with a
“one size fits all” pandemic warning strategy that risks
antagonising and distancing communities and thereby
reducing trust in agencies and the likelihood that advice
will be followed. Agencies must acknowledge that the
public are diverse and need to be involved in the devel-
opment and management of pandemic response initia-
tives appropriate for different communities and sensitive
to existing cultural and/or spiritual practices.
Pacific Peoples and Māori focus groups identified com-
munity institutions with established mechanisms which
could provide useful vehicles for the dissemination of
information and engaging with the community. With a
community engagement perspective the role of the health
agencies would be that of consultant to the community or
a change agent rather than trying to disseminate directly
to the public in a top-down approach. For all segments of
the population, the effectiveness of risk communication
can be increased by using community engagement and
empowerment principles that help tailor information to
the needs and expectations of diverse groups.
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relation to the wider context of overall societal emer-
gency preparedness. Preparedness for specific events,
such as pandemics, might be better situated within
more general risk campaigns rather than as stand alone
approaches. Such a collaborative approach would also
help reduce the sense that people have of being bom-
barded with information from multiple sources with fre-
quently conflicting messages.
Information alone is insufficient to motivate people to
prepare. The way in which information is presented or
conveyed is an important factor in determining an indi-
vidual’s response. People wanted messages about specific
actions that they could take to protect themselves and
their families and to mitigate any consequences. They
wanted transparent and honest communication where
both good and bad news is conveyed. There was a desire
across all groups for clear and specific information, such
as infection and/or death rates and defining symptoms.
This reflects a failure to distinguish between the pan-
demic and its consequences and highlights the impor-
tance of doing so for risk communication.
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